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EMPLOYERS BEWARE! THE SUPREME
COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF TITLE VII'S
EMPLOYEE NUMEROSITY REQUIREMENT
DISADVANTAGES SMALL BUSINESSES
Patten Courtnell*
I. INTRODUCTION

In Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.,' the United States Supreme Court
held that the fifteen-employee prerequisite to qualify as an
"employer" under Title VII was a "substantive ingredient of a Title
VII claim for relief' and not a jurisdictional requirement.3 The Court
thus resolved a conflict among the circuits over whether courts
should employ a jurisdictional or merits-based approach to Title
VII's employee numerosity requirement.4
Part II of this comment discusses the facts and procedural issues
that led to the Supreme Court's decision in Arbaugh. Part III
examines the Court's reasoning in deciding that Title VII's employee
numerosity requirement is part of the plaintiffs substantive claim for
relief. Part IV analyzes the Court's reasoning and then explains why
the fifteen-employee requirement is better classified as jurisdictional.
Part V then discusses the negative implications of the Arbaugh

* J.D. Candidate, May 2008, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., English &
Philosophy, Tulane University. My gratitude goes out to all of the editors and staff of the Loyola
of Los Angeles Law Review, Mary Adams and Deepika Saluja in particular, whose hard work
prepared this article for publication. Special thanks to my grandparents, John and Bettina
Barnini, for their constant love and encouragement.
1. Arbaugh II, 126 S. Ct. 1235 (2006).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000).
3. Arbaugh II, 126 S. Ct. at 1238-39.
4. Some circuits have held that the employee requirement is jurisdictional. See, e.g.,
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp. (Arbaugh 1), 380 F.3d 219, 224-25 (5th Cir. 2004); Armbruster v. Quinn,
711 F.2d 1332, 1335 (6th Cir. 1983). Others have come to the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., Da
Silva v. Kinsho Int'l Corp., 229 F.3d 358, 366 (2d Cir. 2000); Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc.,
347 F.3d 72, 83 (3d Cir. 2003).
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Court's holding and advocates the adoption of a proposed bright line
rule.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

From May 2000 until February 2001, Jenifer Arbaugh worked at
the Moonlight Cafe in New Orleans, a restaurant owned by the
defendant, Y&H Corporation (Y&H)." In November 2001, Arbaugh
filed suit in federal district court asserting violations of Title VII and
Louisiana law by Y&H.6
Arbaugh alleged that she was
constructively discharged after being sexually harassed by Yalcin
Hatipoglu, an owner of Y&H.7 Arbaugh's complaint contended that
the federal court had jurisdiction over her Title VII claim under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over her state law
claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.8
After a two-day trial, the jury found that Arbaugh was
constructively discharged from her job as a result of the sexuallyhostile atmosphere.9 Subsequently, Y&H filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. ° Y&H argued
that it did not qualify as an "employer" under Title VII because the
restaurant did not have fifteen or more employees at the time
Arbaugh was discharged." Prior to the motion to dismiss, Y&H did
not contest its status as an employer under Title VII. Y&H also did
not list in its "Contested Issues of Fact" whether it met the required
number of employees. 2
After reviewing the motion to dismiss, the district court found
that Y&H did not, in fact, employ the prerequisite number of
employees. 3 The court, as a result, then vacated its prior judgment
in favor of Arbaugh on the Title VII claim. 4 The court also

5. Arbaugh II, 126 S. Ct. at 1240.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See Complaint at 1, Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 444 F. Supp. 2d 693 (E.D. La. 2003) (No.
01-3376).
9. Arbaugh II, 126 S. Ct. at 1241.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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dismissed Arbaugh's pendent state law claims for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction.' 5
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's
holding. 6 Relying on its prior decision in Dumas v. Mount Vernon, 7
the court held that failure to qualify as an "employer" under Title VII
deprives a district court of subject-matter jurisdiction.' 8 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the circuit split
over whether the employee numerosity requirement in "Title VII was
jurisdictional or simply an element of a plaintiff's claim for relief." 9
III. REASONING OF THE SUPREME COURT

The Court recognized that broad application of the term
"jurisdiction" results in federal court opinions that do not thoroughly
articulate whether a dismissal is for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), or for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule
12(b)(6).2 ° When a case is dismissed for failure to establish a
preliminary fact, such as the fifteen-employee requirement, this
distinction can be critical. An objection to subject-matter jurisdiction
may be raised at any time, by any party, or by the court.2 ' In
contrast, a party cannot raise an objection for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted after completion of the trial. 2 In
Arbaugh, if the fifteen-employee threshold was classified as a
"jurisdictional element," then the Court must vacate the judgment for
Arbaugh due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 23 However, if the
numerosity requirement is "merits-based"-merely an element of the
plaintiffs claim for relief-then defendant, Y&H, waived any
objection by failing to raise the issue prior to the district court's
judgment.24
15. Id.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp. (Arbaugh 1), 380 F.3d 219, 230-31 (5th Cir. 2004).
612 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1980).
Arbaugh I, 380 F.3d at 224.
Arbaugh II, 126 S.Ct. at 1242 (citation omitted).

20. Id.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).
Id. R. 12(h)(2).
Arbaugh II, 126 S.Ct. at 1242.
Id.
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A. A Matter of FirstImpressionfor the Supreme Court

The Court began with a discussion of two potentially precedentsetting cases, with particular focus on their lower court "drive-by
jurisdictional rulings."25 First, in Hishon v. King & Spalding,26 the
Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision and held that
Title VII applied to a law firm's partnership decisions.27 The district
court dismissed the Title VII claim under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that Title VII was inapplicable to
the selection of partners by a partnership.28 In its opinion, the
Supreme Court noted that the reversal "[made] it unnecessary to
consider the wisdom of the District Court's invocation of Rule
12(b)(1), as opposed to Rule 12(b)(6). ' '29

Thus, in Arbaugh, the

Court noted that the Hishon opinion raised, but did not resolve, the
issue of whether the district court's dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction was correct.3"
Second, in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
vs. Arabian American Oil Co.,3 the Court affirmed the lower court's
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.32 Here, the Court held that the plaintiffs claim could
not be heard in federal court because Title VII did not apply to a U.S.
citizen working abroad for a U.S. company.33 In its opinion, the
Court confirmed the petitioner's characterization of the terms listed
in Title VII's "Definitions" section34 as "jurisdictional."35
In
Arbaugh, the Court reasoned that Arabian American Oil Co. is not
precedent because the "decision did not turn on [the dismissal's]

25. Id. at 1242-43. The court coined the phrase "drive-by jurisdictional rulings" to refer to
"unrefined" judicial opinions which dismissed cases for lack of jurisdiction without explicitly
considering whether the dismissal was for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or for failure to state
a claim. Id. The court noted that such dispositions should be accorded "no precedential effect" as
to whether the federal court had authority to adjudicate the claim. Id.
26. 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
27. Id. at 72-73.
28. Id. at 73 n.2.
29. Id.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Arbaugh II, 126 S. Ct. at 1243.
499 U.S. 244 (1991).
Id. at 246-47.
Id. at 249.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (defining "employer" as requiring fifteen or more employees).
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 251, 253.
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characterization, and the parties did not cross swords over it."36
Thus, the Court was not prompted to address whether the lower
court's dismissal was correctly based on lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.37
Next, the Court addressed two cases that Y&H relied on to
support its claim that the fifteen-employee requirement is
jurisdictional. First, Y&H alleged that the Court categorized the
employee requirement as jurisdictional when it ruled that the
defendant met the fifteen-employee prerequisite38 in Walters v.
Metropolitan Educational Enterprises,Inc.." Y&H asserted that if
the Court considered the fifteen-employee requirement a "merits
issue," then it would have remanded the employee calculation to the
district court.4" The Supreme Court dismissed this argument because
the parties in Walters stipulated to all relevant facts, thus leaving
nothing for a trier of fact to determine on remand.4'
Second, Y&H referenced a footnote from EEOC vs. Commercial
Office Products Co.,42 in which the Court held that the EEOC did not
have the right to enforce Title VII against employers with less than
fifteen employees.43 In Arbaugh the Court explained that the
footnote in Commercial Office Products Co. did not address the issue
of subject-matter jurisdiction; rather it defined the "administrative
provinces of the EEOC and state agencies." 44
B. Three Reasons Why the Employee Numerosity
Requirement Should Be an Element of the Claimfor Relief
The Arbaugh court focused on three reasons why the fifteenemployee requirement is an element of the plaintiffs claim for relief,
rather than a jurisdictional element. First, the Court stated that
labeling the employee requirement "jurisdictional" goes against

36.
37.
38.
944).
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp. (Arbaugh II), 126 S.Ct. 1235, 1243 (2006).
Id.
Brief of Respondent at 8-10, Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 126 S.Ct. 1235 (2006) (No. 04519 U.S. 202 (1997).
Id.
Arbaugh 11, 126 S. Ct. at 1243 n.7.
486 U.S. 107 (1988).
Id. at 119 n.5; see also Brief of Respondent, supra note 38, at 12.
Arbaugh II, 126 S.Ct. at 1243 n.9.
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congressional intent.45 If the employee requirement is a threshold to
establishing subject-matter jurisdiction, then federal courts are
obligated to establish the requirement even without objection from
the parties to the case. 46 The Arbaugh Court reasoned that there is no
evidence in the text of Title VII that Congress intended federal
courts, on their own, to establish the number of employees. 47 The
fifteen-employee requirement appears in a section, entitled
"Definitions, 48 that does not refer to the jurisdiction of federal
courts. 49 Thus, the Court concluded that Congress did not intend for
the fifteen-employee threshold to be a jurisdictional element."
Second, the Court stated that the requirement is not
jurisdictional because a jury, not a judge, should establish the
number of employees." The jury is always the proper reviewer of
fact when a preliminary element of a claim for relief is at issue. 2
The Court noted, however, that if the employee requirement is
jurisdictional, then there are some cases where the trial judge would
be allowed to resolve the dispute.53 Specifically, the Court pointed to
cases like Arbaugh where subject-matter jurisdiction relies on a
disputed fact such as the number of employees. 4 In these cases, the
Court expressed concern that if the fact at issue is labeled
jurisdictional, then the trial judge may have discretion to evaluate the
evidence rather than the jury, which is the proper reviewer in these
55
cases.
Third, the Court said that classifying the number of employees
as jurisdictional requires the dismissal of pendent state law claims
already tried on the merits, resulting in a "waste of judicial
resources."56 When a federal claim is dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1)
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the federal court has no
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

See id. at 1244.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Arbaugh II, 126 S. Ct. at 1244.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
Arbaugh II, 126 S. Ct. at 1245.
See id. at 1244.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 1245 (citation omitted).
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discretion to apply supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state
law claims and, therefore, must dismiss them.17 In contrast, a court
retains discretion to adjudicate any pendent state law claims if it
dismisses the federal claims under Rule 12(b)(6)." Since Arbaugh's
state law claims were already tried and judged on the merits in
federal court, the Court held that the fifteen-employee requirement is
an element of the plaintiff's claim for relief. 9
C. Result: A Bright Line Rule For
Employee Numerosity Requirements
The Arbaugh Court identified Congress' power to state that a
threshold requirement in a statute is jurisdictional.6" The Court cited
28 U.S.C. § 1332 as an example. There, Congress made a $75,000
amount-in-controversy a threshold prerequisite of subject-matter
jurisdiction in defining diversity jurisdiction.6 '
In Arbaugh, the Court determined that Congress did not clearly
indicate whether Title VII's employee threshold is jurisdictional.6 2 In
Arbaugh, the plaintiff brought her claims into federal court under 28
U.S.C. § 1331, the federal question jurisdiction statute,63 and Title
According to the Court,
VII's jurisdiction-conferring provision.'
neither 28 U.S.C. § 1331 nor Title VII's jurisdiction-conferring
provision specifies a requirement analogous to section 1332's
monetary prerequisite.65 Instead, the fifteen-employee threshold is
contained in a separate section of Title VII that does not refer to
subject-matter jurisdiction.6 6
Next, the Arbaugh opinion focused on the unjust outcome and
excessive use of judicial resources that would result if the fifteen57. 16 JAMES WM MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 106.66[l] (3d ed. 2006).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (2000); 16 MOORE ET AL., supra note 57.
59. Arbaugh 11, 126 S. Ct. at 1245.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1244.
62. Id. at 1245.
63. Id. at 1240.
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3); see also Arbaugh II, 126 S. Ct. at 1239 ("[W]hen Title
VII was enacted, § 1331's umbrella provision for federal-question jurisdiction contained an
Title VII, framed in that light, assured that the amount-inamount-in-controversy limitation ....
controversy limitation would not impede an employment-discrimination complainant's access to
a federal forum.").
65. Arbaugh II, 126 S. Ct. at 1245.
66. Id.
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employee threshold was considered jurisdictional.67 Due to these
factors, the Court decided to "leave the ball in Congress' court."68 It
created a bright line rule: "[W]hen Congress does not rank a
statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat
the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character."69 Applying the rule,
the Court held that the fifteen-employee requirement is an element of
a plaintiffs claim for relief and cannot be raised post-trial in order to
challenge a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction.70
IV.

ANALYSIS

The Arbaugh Court's holding that Title VII's fifteen-employee
prerequisite is an element of the plaintiffs claim for relief is based
on (1) a presumption of congressional intent, (2) a belief that the jury
is the proper trier of fact, and (3) a desire to prevent the dismissal of
pendent state law claims already tried on the merits. Despite this,
Title VII's employee threshold is better categorized as a
jurisdictional element.
The evidence of congressional intent
regarding Title VII is inconclusive and actually favors the
jurisdictional approach.7 '
Additionally, to conserve judicial
resources, a judge should decide before trial whether the employer
has less than fifteen employees unless that issue is closely tied to the
merits of the case.72
A. Evidence of CongressionalIntent is Not Conclusive

Until the Supreme Court's decision in Arbaugh, the circuit
courts were split on the issue of whether the fifteen-employee
requirement was a jurisdictional or merits-based issue. 73 This is
because there is little evidence of the purpose of Title VII's

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See infra Part IV.A.
72. See infra Part IV.B.
73. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial
Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 623 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that the Americans with Disabilities Act's
employee requirement, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A), which is almost identical to Title VII's
requirement, is not jurisdictional).
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employee requirement.74 However, several conclusions may be
drawn about Congress' intent by studying the structure and language
of Title VII, as well as the status of this issue in relevant case law
during the time that Congress was amending Title VII.
Arguably, the structure of Title VII is an indication of Congress'
intent to make the fifteen-employee threshold a jurisdictional
element. The definition of "employer" is located in the "Definitions"
section at the beginning of the statute and all successive sections are
labeled as "subsections" of the definitional section.75 A natural
reading of the statute incorporates the definitions into all of the
subsections, including the jurisdictional provision.76 In Nesbit v.
Gears Unlimited, Inc., however, followed by the Supreme Court in
Arbaugh, the Third Circuit dismissed this argument.77 The Nesbit
court held that Congress would have clearly stated its intent if it
meant for Title VII's definitional section to confer jurisdiction.7 8
Congress' intent is clarified further by comparing Title VII with
similar antidiscrimination statutes. For example, the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) 79 contains definitional sections like Title
VII, 8 ° but the statute does not discuss substantive law in the
"subsections" of its definitional section.'
Unlike Title VII, the
structure of the ADA does not indicate that Congress intended the
definition sections to carry over into any of the substantive sections. 2
74. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. H9525 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. Brooks)
("[W]hen a company has less than 15 employees, there are no damages available whatsoever
because there is no cause of action under our current antidiscrimination statutes."). The Third
Circuit quoted Rep. Brooks in Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited to support the merits-based approach by
implication. 347 F.3d 72, 81 (3d. Cir. 2003). In light of the relevant case law at the time,
however, this statement could support the jurisdictional approach as well. See Jeffrey A.
Mandell, The Procedural Posture of Minimum Employee Thresholds in Federal
Antidiscrimination Statutes, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 1047, 1063 n.92 (2005) (arguing that the speaker
may have meant that there was no cause of action because courts lack authority to hear cases
where the minimum employee threshold is not met).
75. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e ("Definitions" section of Title VII containing the fifteenemployee requirement), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (unlawful employment practices), and 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (enforcement powers of the EEOC).
76. Mandell, supra note 74, at 1057-58.
77. Nesbit, 347 F.3d at 72.
78. Id. at 81 (noting that the "Definitions" section, § 2000e(b), does not contain the word
"jurisdiction" like 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1332).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (2000).
80. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102, 12111, 12131, 12161, 12181 (containing definitions).
81. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
82. Id.
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It is not entirely apparent, however, whether this difference in statute
structure is significant enough to show Congress' intent to make the
fifteen-employee requirement jurisdictional.83
A second possibility is that Congress intended to make the
employee requirement jurisdictional based on the language of Title
VII's definition of "employer." The term "employer" is defined by
the statute as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has fifteen or more employees."84 Congress enacted Title VII
under its Commerce Clause power.85 Arguably then, Title VII's
employee minimum is jurisdictional because establishing the
threshold is essential to Congress' constitutional power to pass and
enforce the statute.86 It is possible that Congress determined that a
minimum of fifteen employees is the threshold requirement for when
an employer affects commerce.87 The Supreme Court held that for
Congress to regulate under its Commerce Clause power, the
regulated activity must have a "substantial relation" to, or
"substantially affect[]," interstate commerce.88
The employee
requirement, thus, is arguably intended to ensure that the employer
has enough of an effect on interstate commerce to be subject to
federal regulation. Unfortunately, there is no definitive legislative
history on this issue."
Finally, Congress' intent may be inferred by analyzing the
relevant case law at the time Congress amended Title VII. Although
the Arbaugh Court claims the jurisdictional versus merits-based issue
is a matter of first impression, the federal courts' prior "drive-by
jurisdictional rulings" may have some non-precedential value." In
Arabian American Oil Co., for example, the Supreme Court affirmed
83. See Mandell, supra note 74, at 1057 n.61 (noting that the structure of Title VII may not
have been intended by Congress).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (emphasis added).
85. See EEOC v. Ratliff, 906 F.2d 1314, 1315-16 (9th Cir. 1990).
86. Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F.3d 72, 81-82 (3d Cir. 2003).
87. Id. at 81 ("[O]ne might read the fifteen-employee threshold as reflecting Congress's
determination that only those companies with fifteen or more employees have the requisite
substantial effect on interstate commerce to permit Congress to enact the statute.").
88. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).
89. See Mandell, supra note 74, at 1060 (noting that the "legislative history contains
evidence substantiating this perspective"). But see Nesbit, 347 F.3d at 82 (finding that "while the
preceding Commerce Clause-based justification for Title VII's fifteen-employee requirement
makes intuitive sense, it finds little support in the legislative history") (emphasis added).
90. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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the district court's Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction when it held that Title VII did not apply to a U.S. citizen
working abroad for a U.S. company.91 The Court copied "en
passant" the plaintiffs description of the terms in Title VII's
"Definitions" section as "jurisdictional. 92 As a result of the decision
in Arabian American Oil Co., Congress amended the definition of
"employee" in Title VII to include U.S. citizens working abroad.93
During this time, Congress arguably believed that the Supreme
Court considered the terms in Title VII's "Definitions" section to be
jurisdictional, and Congress made no objection to this categorization.
This leaves open the possibility that Congress did in fact intend for
Title VII's definitions to confer subject-matter jurisdiction on the
federal courts.
B. ProceduralIssues: The ProperTrier of Fact
and the Dismissal of Pendent State Law Claims
The Arbaugh Court miscalculates the effect that a
"jurisdictional" employee numerosity requirement will have on the
trier of fact and the dismissal of a plaintiffs pendant state law
claims. In cases where the fifteen-employee requirement is closely
tied to the merits of the case, a federal court requires that a jury
decide the issue.94 Otherwise, when the employee requirement is not
intertwined with the merits, the judge should decide whether the
fifteen-employee requirement is met before trial to preserve judicial
resources.
Judges should only admit evidence and make findings of fact
when the jurisdictional facts do not overlap with the merits of the
claim.95 When the court decides that the employee threshold is not at
issue, the judge is the most expedient trier of fact. The judge
determines both whether the court has subject-matter jurisdiction and
the number of employees before trial.

91. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 246-47 (1991).
92. Id. at 249, 251, 253.
93. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1077
(1991) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f)).
94. See 2 JAMES WM MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.30[3] (3d ed.
2006).
95. Id.
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The question of whether an employer has fifteen or more
employees usually arises in one of two ways: (1) the plaintiff
believes that employees from other parent or subsidiary companies
should be counted, or (2) the status of an individual as an
"employee" or an "independent contractor" is in question.9 6 Since
both of these questions involve applying legal principles, a judge is
arguably the better trier of fact.97 Rarely do these issues involve
solely questions for a jury, for example, whether a certain person was
actually employed by the company.9" In cases where the employee
requirement does turn upon an issue for the jury, then the judge can
decide whether to also hold an evidentiary hearing before trial to
determine whether the defendant has the requisite number of
employees. 99 If the employer fails to meet the threshold, then the
parties to the case avoid the expense of discovery and the trial costs
of litigating in federal court. Similarly, the federal court can further
prevent the waste of judicial and economic resources by dismissing
pendent state law claims before any discovery has taken place.
V. IMPLICATIONS

The Court's holding in Arbaugh raises a constitutional question
about Congress' power to regulate, and it negatively impacts small
businesses by increasing costs and creating uncertainty about the
outcome of Title VII claims.' Because federal courts have limited
jurisdiction,'
as a general rule, the Court should limit federal
subject-matter jurisdiction over Title VII claims to employers with
fifteen or more employees until Congress expressly extends the
statute to include employers with fewer employees.
A. A ProposedBright Line Rule
In EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier ParochialSchool,0 2 the D.C.
Circuit Court, relying on its prior decisions, held that a fifteenemployee requirement was a merits-based element of a federal
96. See Mandell, supra note 74, at 1064.
97. Id.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
See 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 94.
See infra Part V.B-C.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
117 F.3d621 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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antidiscrimination statute. 03 The court's decision hinged on the
wording of Title VII. Ultimately, the court determined that the
language did not expressly limit subject-matter jurisdiction to
employers with fifteen or more employees.' °4 Similarly, the Arbaugh
Court analyzes the language and structure of Title VII for evidence
expressly limit the subject-matter jurisdiction
of Congress' intent 10 to
5
court.
federal
of the
Notably, one D.C. Circuit judge, in his concurrence in St.
Francis, altered his prior merits-based approach in favor of the
jurisdictional approach." 6 He argued that a better standard for
determining Congressional intent in antidiscrimination statutes was
to look to whether anything in the statute expressly extends federal
court jurisdiction to cases without the requisite number of
employees.0 7 This proposed bright line rule is justified because
federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.0 8 Under this
rationale, the Supreme Court should restrict federal jurisdiction to
only those cases where employers have fifteen or more employees
and "leave the ball in Congress' court"'0 9 to clearly and explicitly
state that the employee threshold is not jurisdictional.
B. Implications ofNot Adopting the ProposedBright Line Rule
The Court's decision in Arbaugh means that juries will decide
on a case by case basis whether a small business meets the
requirements of an "employer" under Title VII" ° This places a
substantial burden on the small business owner because it results in
less certainty about the outcomes of Title VII claims as well as
higher litigation costs."' In addition, if the numerosity issue is
decided at trial, there is a risk that the jury's deliberation could be
prejudiced by the merits of the case.'12 Since courts currently have
103. Id. (relying on its prior decision in Haddon v. Walters, 43 F.3d 1488 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
104. Id. at 624.
105. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp. (Arbaugh I1), 126 S.Ct. 1235, 1244 (2006).
106. St. Francis,117 F.3dat 626 (Sentelle, J., concurring).

107. Id.
108. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
109. Arbaugh II,126 S.Ct. at 1245.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. David S.Warner & Kristine A. Sova, Small Employers Beware: The U.S. Supreme Court
Has Ruled that Title Vii's Employee-Numerosity Requirement Does Not Determine Jurisdiction,
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discretion to exercise jurisdiction over a plaintiff's pendent state law
claims, even if the employer does not have fifteen employees, ' 13 the
small business owner may be burdened with litigating state claims in
the federal court system.
These consequences work directly against the overall purpose of
Title VII's employee threshold requirement. Congress designed the
requirement with "an eye toward reigning in federal intervention.""' 4
It established the minimum employee threshold in part because it did
not want to burden small businesses with the cost of litigating federal
antidiscrimination claims." 5 The Supreme Court should not require
small business owners to incur the heightened cost and uncertainty
that results from classifying the employee threshold as a meritsbased element of the plaintiff's claim for relief.
The Supreme Court's holding in Arbaugh also raises a
constitutional question as to whether Congress has the ability to
regulate small business owners with fewer than fifteen employees.
Congress passed Title VII under its Commerce Clause power." 6 In
the last decade, the Supreme Court has reined in Congress' power
under the Commerce Clause to include only those activities that
"substantially affect" interstate commerce." 7 Even if Congress did
not originally intend for the employee threshold to be a
"constitutional anchor,""8' ' an employer with fewer than fifteen
employees may not have a "substantial relation" to, or "substantial
[e]ffect" on interstate commerce.
C. The ProposedBright Line Rule's Effect on the Arbaugh Decision

If the Supreme Court adopts the proposed bright line rule, it
avoids the negative implications of the Arbaugh decision. The
Court's presumption of employee requirements as a jurisdictional
ASAP (Littler Mendelson, New York, N.Y.), Mar. 2006, at 2, http://www.littler.com/collateral/
13661.pdf.
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (2000); 16 MOORE ET AL., supra note 57.
114. Mandell, supra note 74, at 1063.
115. See Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1314 (2d Cir. 1995); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l
Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993).
116. See EEOC v. Ratliff, 906 F.2d 1314, 1315-16 (9th Cir. 1990).
117. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).
118. See Mandell, supra note 74, at 1062 (noting that, at the time Congress enacted Title VII,
the Supreme Court's "affecting commerce" threshold was a much lower standard than it is today
under Lopez).
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element accomplishes Congress' goal of protecting small businesses
by "reigning in federal intervention"" 9 and minimizing the costly
burden of federal antidiscrimination litigation. 2 ' The proposed rule
also delays the constitutional question of whether a business with
less than fifteen employees has the required "substantial relation" to
As long as the employee threshold is
interstate commerce.
VII claims against
jurisdictional, federal courts cannot hear Title
2'
employees.
fifteen
than
fewer
with
employers
The proposed rule gives Congress an opportunity to expressly
extend Title VII jurisdiction to employers with fewer than fifteen
employees if it chooses. Congress could extend jurisdiction if its
interest in providing the plaintiff a federal forum for relief in
antidiscrimination cases outweighs its goal of protecting small
businesses from federal intervention. However, if Congress does
expressly extend Title VII jurisdiction to include smaller employers,22
then the amendment might get invalidated under U.S. v. Lopez,
where the Court significantly reined in legislative Commerce Clause
23

power. 1

VI. CONCLUSION

The Arbaugh Court's decision to make Title VII's fifteenemployee requirement an element of the plaintiff's claim for relief
disadvantages the same small businesses that Congress intended to
protect from the burden of litigating discrimination claims in federal
court. The Court's rationale is misguided. The evidence of whether
Congress intended to make the employee threshold a merits-based or
jurisdictional element is inconclusive. The Court's main goalconservation of judicial resources-is better served by allowing the
trier of fact (judge or jury depending on the particular facts at issue)
to establish the threshold before commencing a trial on the merits.
This result allows for a more timely dismissal of pendent state law
claims. Finally, in light of the limited jurisdiction of federal courts
and Congress' limited power to regulate under the Commerce
Clause, the Court should have left the "ball in Congress' court" to
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.at 1063.
Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314; Miller, 991 F.2d at 587.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).
514 U.S. 549 (1995).

123. Id.at 559.
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expressly extend Title VII to employers with fewer than fifteen
employees.

